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I. INTRODUCTION 
In a democracy, procedural rules hold out the promise that their 
design reflects certain values of that society.  For example, procedural 
rules should promote the efficiency of the courts that apply them.  They 
should be clear and understandable. However, the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure also reflected additional values, at least when they were first 
adopted.  Most importantly, perhaps, they promoted an ethos of access to 
justice.  With liberal discovery rules, expanded joinder provisions and 
straightforward pleading rules, the Civil Rules encouraged the ultimate 
resolution of matters on the merits, and favored disposition by trial.  In 
the decades since their passage, and most recently through a series of 
decisions issued in the last six years, the U.S. Supreme Court has taken 
into account other values in adjudicating the scope and contours of 
procedural rules.  When doing so, they have invoked the need to 
preserve the ability of judges to manage their dockets and protect 
defendants from the costs of drawn out litigation. 
If one constant undergirds the host of values procedural rules are 
supposed to promote, it is that judges should apply such rules fairly and 
impartially.  Although at times it may seem that “different rules apply” 
to certain classes of litigants—take prisoners and other litigants 
proceeding pro se and as indigents as examples—judges are to apply the 
rules fairly and impartially regardless of their own political leanings; the 
political leanings of the litigants before them; the substantive legal issues 
being adjudicated; the sympathy the judge has for a particular cause 
being pursued in a matter before him or her; or the personal affection 
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that judge may feel, or displeasure that judge may harbor, for a party or 
his or her attorney.  These sentiments are reflected in that fundamental 
aspect of the right of due process: the right to be heard by an impartial 
adjudicator. 
A procedural rule that lends itself to partisan application betrays 
this core procedural principle and raises due process concerns.1 What’s 
more, when such partisan use is exposed in the adjudication of particular 
rights established through the substantive lawmaking function of the 
legislative branch, it implicates separation of powers concerns.  
Ultimately, if a seemingly neutral procedural rule can be applied 
differently by different judges based on a particular quality of the judge, 
the litigants, or the substantive issue at stake, it raises doubts about the 
effectiveness of that rule to serve the goal of impartial justice. 
After the Supreme Court issued its rulings in Bell Atlantic v. 
Twombly2 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,3 many raised concerns that these 
precedents introduced a new pleading standard to all civil pleadings in 
federal court that was so malleable and indeterminate that it could be 
invoked by the courts disproportionately in contexts where judges were 
hostile to particular claims, regardless of their merit.4  Commentators 
were especially concerned about the less-than-neutral application of this 
standard in the civil rights context by judges who disfavored such 
claims.5 
The question about the impact of procedural rules on civil rights 
litigants is an important one in light of the critical role the federal courts 
 1  See infra. 
 2  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 3  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 4  See, e.g., Tanvir Vahora, Working Through a Muddled Standard: Pleading 
Discrimination Cases After Iqbal, 44 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 235, 266 (2010) (“The Supreme 
Court upended decades of established precedent and practice with Twombly and Iqbal’s plausibility 
pleading and provided uncomfortably vague criteria with which to evaluate complaints.”) (footnote 
omitted); see, also David Noll, The Indeterminacy of Iqbal, 99 GEO. L. J. 117 (2010) (discussing the 
questions raised by the plausibility standard). 
 5  As Ramzi Kassem writes: 
Because judicial outcomes are not insulated from the influence of judges’ backgrounds 
and because Iqbal gives judges ample berth to express their subjective outlooks as they 
apply the indeterminate plausibility standard to incipient claims, Iqbal raises concern 
that Muslim and other minority plaintiffs asserting discrimination claims may fare poorly 
unless pleading standards are readjusted. 
Ramzi Kassem, Implausible Realities: Iqbal’s Entrenchment of Minority Group Skepticism Towards 
Discrimination Claims, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1443, 1474-1475 (2010); see, also Elizabeth M. 
Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil 
Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517 (2010) (describing disparate 
impact of plausibility standard on civil rights cases). 
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play in the protection of those rights.  From the early days of the Civil 
Rights Movement, even before the Supreme Court issued its landmark 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education,6 the federal courts were at the 
center of fights over the civil rights of African-Americans, and, later, 
entered the fray on the equality of racial and ethnic minorities and of 
women.  They are now at the center of the fight for marriage equality. 
Sometimes, as in the Brown litigation and its progeny, courts have 
adjudicated the scope and extent of constitutional rights.  Since the mid-
1960s, they have ruled on the application of federal statutes protecting 
civil rights in the context of employment, housing, and public 
accommodations.  At times, courts have been receptive to such 
substantive claims and took expansive views of their reach and 
application.  Indeed, in 1966, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure was amended to incorporate and validate some of the creative 
mechanisms used by judges and litigants in civil rights litigation up to 
that point in history.7  At other times, they have curtailed such rights, 
holding, for example, that affirmative action programs designed to assist 
blacks and other minorities discriminated against whites.8 
In some instances, Congress has stepped in to give explicit 
guidance to the courts as to how they should approach the substantive 
adjudication of civil rights claims.9  Similarly, when otherwise neutral 
procedural rules seemed to be applied unequally against certain classes 
of civil rights litigants, as was the case with the 1983 amendments to 
Rule 11 of the federal rules, efforts at the legislative rulemaking level 
corrected such apparent disparate application of the otherwise neutral 
rule.10 
This Article attempts to assess, empirically, whether the Court’s 
introduction of the so-called “plausibility standard” in the context of 
civil pleadings has had a disparate impact on civil rights claims, 
particularly in employment and housing discrimination cases.  In a 
previous study conducted by one of the co-authors of this Article,11 it 
 6  Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 7  Jack Greenberg, Civil Rights Class Actions: Procedural Means of Obtaining Substance, 
39 ARIZ. L. REV. 575, 577 (1997) (noting role of civil rights litigation in informing 1966 
amendment to Rule 23). 
 8  See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding affirmative 
action in municipal contracting unconstitutional). 
 9  See, e.g., The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071 
(1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)) (changing, inter alia, certain procedural 
requirements in employment discrimination cases in light of restrictive judicial rulings). 
 10  See infra text accompanying notes 76-94. 
 11  Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in 
Employment and Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L. J. 235 (2012). 
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was revealed that in a sample of employment and housing discrimination 
cases, courts were more likely to dismiss these cases based on the lack of 
specificity of the pleadings after the Court’s decision in Iqbal.  
Furthermore, that study also found, after Iqbal, a significant rise in both 
the number of reported decisions in such cases on motions challenging 
the specificity of the pleadings, as well as a significant rise in the 
number of decisions dismissing such actions. 
While this prior study found statistically significant differences in 
outcomes in cases and in the number of motions filed and motions 
granted after Iqbal, that study did not look at a range of known qualities 
of the judges issuing these decisions to determine whether any particular 
quality tended to correspond to an outcome in a particular case.  For 
example, did the gender of the judge tend to matter in the dismissal rate 
of cases?  The instant study attempts to assess the relevance of certain 
characteristics of the judges issuing decisions dismissing cases on the 
grounds that the complaints were not sufficiently specific to satisfy the 
command of Rule 8(a) and the plausibility standard read into the rule in 
Twombly and Iqbal.  To pursue such ends, this study looked at a range of 
judicial characteristics—the party affiliation of the president appointing 
each judge, the gender of each judge, and the race or ethnicity of the 
judge—to determine whether any of these characteristics corresponded 
to a difference in outcomes in civil rights cases. 
This study assessed outcomes in 548 cases involving motions to 
dismiss in employment and housing discrimination claims in federal 
court from 2004 through the end of 2010.  This assessment revealed that 
several of these characteristics—e.g., party affiliation of the nominating 
president—had a statistically significant relationship to the outcomes of 
decisions granting or denying motions to dismiss challenging the 
specificity of the pleadings.  More specifically, this study revealed a 
statistically significant relationship between dismissal rates and time 
period (i.e., pre-Twombly, post-Twombly but pre-Iqbal, and post-Iqbal) 
in reported opinions of judges appointed by Republican presidents, in 
those issued by white judges, and those issued by male judges.  In 
contrast, in decisions by judges appointed by Democratic presidents, and 
in decisions issued by women, there was no statistically significant 
relationship between outcomes of motions to dismiss on the grounds of 
the lack of specificity of the pleadings and time period.  Because of 
small sample sizes, the results with respect to the race and ethnicity of 
the judges were somewhat inconclusive. 
These findings raise questions about whether the plausibility 
standard, as articulated by the Court in Twombly and Iqbal, can 
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appropriately be described as a neutral principle of procedure.  When 
deploying the plausibility standard, the Court stated that district court 
judges should use their “judicial experience and common sense” to 
determine whether a complaint’s allegations contain enough specificity 
to make them plausible.  Yet if variations in outcomes in decisions based 
on the party affiliation of the president appointing the judge exist, does 
this suggest that this rule of procedure is one that may be open to an 
unacceptable degree of interpretative flexibility?  Moreover, does such 
flexibility too easily lend itself to pre-existing judicial proclivities, ones 
that might otherwise favor or oppose a particular plaintiff’s cause? 
To describe these findings and explore their implications, this 
Article proceeds as follows.  Part II provides a brief overview of the 
evolution of pleading standards, from the introduction of the federal 
rules to the issuance of Twombly and Iqbal.  Part III will provide an 
overview of past studies on the impact of these decisions on litigation in 
the federal courts, explore some of the implications of the plausibility 
standard and the due process questions it raises.  Part IV describes the 
methodology and findings of this study and explores some of the 
implications of these findings. 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF PLEADING STANDARDS AND THE RISE OF THE 
PLAUSIBILITY STANDARD IN TWOMBLY AND IQBAL 
Rule 8(a)(2) specifies that in a pleading, a party must provide a 
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief.”12  Interpreting this standard in 1957, in a civil rights 
action, the Supreme Court found that a complaint13 should not be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) “unless it 
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”14  This 
interpretation of the Rule, known as the Conley standard, was re-
affirmed in several subsequent Supreme Court opinions.15 
In late 2006, the Court was given an opportunity to review the 
 12  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 13  While the Supreme Court addressed whether a complaint was sufficient to stand the test 
of Rule 8(a), this Rule applies to all pleadings.  This study assessed district courts’ reviews of 
complaints only, and did not assess other pleadings to which the Rule applies. 
 14  Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). 
 15  See, e.g., McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 246 (1980) (quoting Conley’s “no set 
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Conley standard in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly,16 an anti-trust action.  The 
plaintiffs had alleged that the similar pricing schemes of the defendants 
and the failure to appear to compete in certain geographic markets must 
have been the result of illegal collusion.17 
In assessing the strength of the plaintiffs’ claims, the Court 
introduced what has been called the “More Plausible Test.”18  The Court 
assessed the likelihood of plaintiffs’ allegations compared to another 
completely lawful explanation for the defendants’ conduct: i.e., that the 
price fluctuations were a product of market forces as opposed to illicit 
agreement.19  The Court concluded that “without some further factual 
enhancement,” the plaintiffs’ allegation of mere parallel conduct “stops 
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitle[ment] to 
relief.”20  Thus, the complaint deserved dismissal because, when viewed 
through the lens of the plausibility standard, the plaintiffs failed to 
“nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.”21  
Making clear that this plausibility standard should supersede Conley’s 
“no set of facts” approach, the Court issued a polite coup de grâce, 
finding that the Conley standard had “earned its retirement.”22 
Two years later, when given the opportunity to make clear that the 
new plausibility standard should apply to all civil pleadings, the Court 
heard and decided Twombly’s sister opinion: Ashcroft v. Iqbal23  The 
original plaintiffs in Iqbal were detained as part of the global law 
enforcement effort that followed in the wake of the attacks of Sept. 11, 
2001.  Iqbal himself was held in a maximum-security unit of the 
Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York, under harsh 
conditions of confinement, on various charges unrelated to any acts of 
terrorism.24  Iqbal pled guilty to certain charges and was deported to 
Pakistan.25  Almost two years after his deportation, he filed suit against 
 16  550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 17  Id. at 548-50.  A review of the complaint in the action indicates that the plaintiffs in 
Twombly had alleged more than mere parallel conduct, including statements of at least one industry 
executive; allegations that appear to have been ignored in the Supreme Court’s opinion.  See 
Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 
(2007) (No. 05-1126), 2006 WL 2472651, at *20–27. 
 18  Brescia, supra note 11, at 279. 
 19  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 568-69. 
 20  Id. at 557 (alteration in original). 
 21  Id. at 570. 
 22  Id. at 563. 
 23  556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 24  First Amended Complaint & Jury Demand at *15, Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 1:04-cv-
01809-JG-SMG (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005), 2004 WL 3756442. 
 25  Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 149 (2nd Cir. 2007). 
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various defendants in the federal court for the Eastern District of New 
York, including Attorney General Ashcroft and Federal Bureau of 
Investigation Director Mueller.26 
With respect to the defendants Ashcroft and Mueller, the complaint 
alleged their involvement in several aspects of the allegedly illegal 
treatment of the plaintiffs.  The complaint contained allegations that 
Ashcroft and Mueller approved of a “policy of holding post-September-
11th detainees in highly restrictive conditions of confinement until they 
were ‘cleared’ by the FBI.”27  According to the complaint, Ashcroft was 
the “principal architect” of this policy,28 and Mueller was “instrumental 
in [its] adoption, promulgation, and implementation.”29  Furthermore, 
the complaint alleged that these defendants “knew of, condoned, and 
willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [Iqbal] . . . [to harsh and 
unlawful] conditions of confinement as a matter of policy, solely on 
account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin . . . .”30 
Ashcroft and Mueller filed 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, and the 
trial court, citing the “no set of facts” language from Conley v. Gibson, 
granted the motion in part but denied it with respect to many claims 
contained in the complaint, including those related to the alleged 
conduct of Ashcroft and Mueller described above.31 
While Ashcroft and Mueller’s appeal was pending in the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court issued the decision in Bell 
Atlantic v. Twombly, and the appellate court’s ruling in Iqbal ultimately 
measured the plaintiff’s complaint against the plausibility standard, 
finding, for the most part, that the complaint had satisfied it.32  The 
Second Circuit ruled in this fashion given the context in which the 
allegations of the complaint arose: i.e., the court found that given the 
importance and high profile nature of the law enforcement actions 
following the September 11th attacks, it was plausible that defendants 
Ashcroft and Mueller had some role in the allegedly unlawful treatment 
experienced by the plaintiff.33 
The Supreme Court reviewed the Second Circuit’s decision and, in 
 26  First Amended Complaint & Jury Demand, at *4-10. 
 27  Id. at *13-14. 
 28  Id. at *4. 
 29  Id. at *4-5. 
 30  Id. at *17-18; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 669 (2009) (recounting 
allegations in the complaint). 
 31  See Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 1:04-cv-01809-JG-SMG, 2005 WL 2375202, at *29 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005). 
 32  Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 170 (2nd Cir. 2007). 
 33  Id. at 175-78. 
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its opinion reversing the Second Circuit, articulated two “working 
principles” at the heart of the Twombly approach to pleadings.  First, it 
found that conclusory allegations are not entitled to the presumption of 
truth normally afforded allegations at the motion to dismiss stage.34  
Second, it reaffirmed the plausibility standard, stating, “only a complaint 
that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.”35 
The Court went on to elaborate on the meaning of the plausibility 
standard, stating that assessing the plausibility of a complaint is a 
“context-specific task.”36  Such a task, the Court held, “requires the 
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense” 
when assessing plausibility.37 
Applying the first of the working principles, the Court rejected the 
allegations that Ashcroft and Mueller had condoned harsh conditions of 
confinement, finding them merely conclusory, warranting dismissal.38  
The Court then went on to review the allegations that the policy of “hold 
until cleared” fell along racial lines against the plausibility standard.39  It 
explicitly applied the More Plausible Test to these allegations, and found 
that, because of the existence of other, more likely and entirely lawful 
explanations for the conduct, they did not set forth a plausible claim for 
relief.  The Court found as follows: “Taken as true, these allegations are 
consistent with petitioners’ purposefully designating detainees ‘of high 
interest’ because of their race, religion, or national origin. But given 
more likely explanations, they do not plausibly establish this purpose.”40 
According to the Court, because the terrorist attacks were carried 
out by Arab Muslim members of an Islamic fundamentalist group, it was 
entirely plausible that a law enforcement effort in their wake would 
sweep up individuals who happened to be perceived as Arab Muslim in 
the absence of any discriminatory motive.41  As the Court noted, “[a]s 
between that ‘obvious alternative explanation’ for the arrests” (i.e., that 
the race or ethnicity of the detainee was purely incidental) “and the 
purposeful, invidious discrimination respondent asks us to infer, 
 34  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
 35  Id. at 678-79. 
 36  Id. at 679. 
 37  Id. 
 38  Id. at 680-81. 
 39  Id. at 682-83. 
 40  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009) (emphasis added). 
 41  As the Court of Appeals noted, Iqbal’s claim was that he was discriminated against based 
on a perception that he was Arab Muslim, while, in reality, he was of Pakistani descent and not 
Arab.  Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 147-48 n.2 (2nd Cir. 2007). 
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discrimination is not a plausible conclusion.”42  In addition, the Court 
found that Iqbal’s allegations regarding the “hold until cleared” policy 
were devoid of “factual content to ‘nudg[e]’ his claim of purposeful 
discrimination ‘across the line from conceivable to plausible.’”43 
III. THE PLAUSIBILITY STANDARD, DUE PROCESS, AND THE LESSON OF 
RULE 11 
A. Critiques of the Plausibility Standard 
The new plausibility standard is just seven years old, but the 
Twombly and Iqbal precedents have been cited tens of thousands of 
times, and its critics are nearly as numerous.44  One of the main critiques 
of the plausibility standard is that it is too indeterminate and leaves 
judges with few standards to apply when considering whether the 
allegations in a pleading satisfy the requirements of Rule 8(a).  The main 
fear surrounding the nature of the standard—that it is somewhat vague 
and indeterminate—is that it leaves room for improper biases—
conscious and/or implicit45—to creep into judicial decision making in 
certain areas of law, areas where a particular judge, or a group of judges, 
might harbor a hostile predisposition to litigants seeking to vindicate 
certain rights.46 
 42  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 682 (2009) (citation omitted). 
 43  Id. at 683 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 
 44  Critiques of the plausibility standard include: Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly 
to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 9-10 (2010) 
(arguing that the introduction of the plausibility standard is part of the Supreme federal judiciary’s 
“continued retreat from the principles of citizen access, private enforcement of public policies, and 
equality of litigant treatment in favor of corporate interests and concentrated wealth.”); Kevin M. 
Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 823 
(2010) (criticizing the plausibility standard); Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and 
Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 852 (2010) (arguing that it 
was Congress’ role and not the Court’s to adopt a new pleading standard); Sybil Dunlop & 
Elizabeth Cowan Wright, Plausible Deniability: How the Supreme Court Created a Heightened 
Pleading Standard Without Admitting They Did So, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 205, 208 (2010). 
 45  The literature on judicial bias is extensive.  Recent scholarship on the topic is collected at 
Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Disqualification Matters.  Again., 30 REV. LITIG. 671, 649-97 
n.2 (2011) (citations omitted).  The research on implicit judicial bias is still evolving. See, e.g., 
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Does Unconscious 
Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1197 (2009). 
 46  See, e.g., Access to Justice Denied: Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 
61-62 (2009) [hereinafter Access to Justice Hearing] (statement of John Vail, Senior Litigation 
Counsel and Vice President, Center for Constitutional Litigation), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/111th/111-36_53090.PDF (criticizing plausibility 
standard for providing judges with too much discretion); id. at 79, 84-89 (statement of Debo P. 
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Such a defect implicates several values that are supposed to infuse 
procedural rules and procedural justice.  First, adjective, procedural rules 
are supposed to be trans-substantive and neutral, i.e., applicable to all 
areas of law and not subject to manipulation in a way that affects 
particular substantive rights adversely.  Second, when procedural rules 
are applied differently in contexts affecting different substantive rights, 
it creates separation of powers concerns, i.e., that judges are 
overstepping their functions and entering the province of the legislature 
by treating some substantive rights differently than others.47  Third, 
when partiality creeps into decision making, enabled by the application 
of vague rules, it implicates due process concerns: that is, when 
supposedly neutral rules are drawn with such imprecision, it invites the 
introduction of improper partiality to infect decision making.48  
Moreover, when the judicial function is infected with such partiality, it 
implicates a fundamental element of due process: the right to have one’s 
case heard by an impartial adjudicator.  Such questions then raise a 
fourth concern; they raise doubts about the legitimacy of judicial 
decisions when judges are seen as applying supposedly neutral rules in 
ways that favor certain classes of litigants over others.49  These values 
are discussed below. 
B. The Consequences of the Plausibility Standard, the Logic of the 
Rules, and the Limits of Due Process 
1. The Promise of Procedural Neutrality and Trans-Substantivity 
A central organizing principle of trans-substantive, procedural rules 
is that they should function in a neutral, apolitical way.  They should not 
be subject to political manipulation by the courts, and, through their 
Adegbile, Director of Litigation, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund) (expressing fear 
that plausibility standard in Iqbal will have a disparate impact on civil rights litigants); see also 
Open Access to Courts Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 4115 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and 
Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 25, 32-34 (2009) (statement of 
Professor Eric Schnapper, University of Washington School of Law) (expressing concern that 
judges employing the plausibility standard will dismiss otherwise meritorious civil rights claims on 
technical grounds), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/111th/111-
124_54076.PDF; Kassem, supra note 5, at 1444-47 (criticizing subjective aspects of plausibility 
standard and expressing fear that the standard will be used disproportionately to dismiss claims of 
members of non-dominant, minority communities).  On the impact of cultural biases on judicial 
fact-finding and decision making, see Dan M. Kahan, et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe?  
Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009). 
 47  See infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text. 
 48  See infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text. 
 49  See infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text. 
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even-handed application, they should promote equal justice under law.50  
This concept is embodied in the Rules Enabling Act, the Congressional 
directive authorizing the courts to construct their own procedural rules.  
There, Congress has said as follows: 
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules 
of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United 
States district courts (including proceedings before magistrate judges 
thereof) and courts of appeals. 
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive 
right.  All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force 
or effect after such rules have taken effect.51 
The Rules Enabling Act does two things that point to the goal of neutral 
procedural52 rules that provide the mechanism through which 
substantive rights and duties are measured.  First, it places the duty to 
draft the rules in the branch of government—the judiciary—that, it was 
presumed, would be influenced the least by political forces.53  Second, it 
ensures, explicitly, that procedural rules should not “abridge, enlarge or 
modify” any substantive right.54 
 50  Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An 
Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 
2074 (1989) (footnote omitted). 
 51  28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1990). 
 52  Of course, identifying the line between “substance” and “procedure” is often quite 
difficult, as is identifying a procedural rule that is completely neutral and non-normative.  A 
decision on a procedural matter designed to provide access to the courts has a normative value.  
That decision can also have political ramifications, whether that access is provided to a litigant to 
challenge federal health care legislation, which some of one political stripe might support, or to 
protect the environment against corporate interests, which others would favor.  On some of the 
values underlying procedural rules, see Judith Resnik, The Domain of Courts, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 
2219, 2226 (1989).  In terms of the substance-procedure divide, the late Robert Covert’s description 
of this divide is, not uncharacteristically, elegant, if not original: “that which controls the conduct of 
litigation” is procedural and “that which controls social conduct outside the courtroom” is 
substantive.  Robert M. Covert, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the 
Rules, 84 YALE L. J. 718, 721-722 (1975). 
 53  Carrington, supra note 50, at 2075 (“Congress placed rulemaking under the institution it 
perceived to be least responsive to interest group politics.”) (footnote omitted).  See also, Charles  
E.  Clark, Two Decades of the  Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. REV.  435, 444, n.45 (1958) 
(“Rule-making is a matter for research, study, and judicious analysis and critiques, not one for the 
public platform.”).  Carrington also argues that Rule 1’s emphasis on trans-substantive values also 
establishes the apolitical nature of the Rules.  Carrington, supra note 50, at 2077 (“Rule 1 expresses 
the aspiration, established by the Court, to the rulemaking process’s political neutrality.  We can 
expect near universal support for the goals of justice, dispatch, and economy in litigation.”). 
 54  As Carrington argues: 
One may view the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 as an accommodation in our 
constitutional scheme, a subconstitutional structure designed to increase the long term 
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The campaign to place the power for federal rulemaking in the 
judiciary had been waged for decades,55 informed by the belief that the 
judiciary was the governmental branch best insulated from politics:56 
The proponents of the court rulemaking model thought that the 
judiciary, rather than the legislature, should promulgate the Rules 
because they believed in a sharp dichotomy between substance and 
procedure and trusted that courts would devise sound procedural rules 
through the application of “neutral expertise.”  This view largely 
prevailed during the 1950s and 1960s, which corresponded with a 
period of significant consensus in favor of legal process theory in 
American public law and resulted in “the golden age of court 
rulemaking.”57 
The trans-substantive nature of the rules—that they, for the most part, 
are to be applied to different causes of actions and substantive areas 
equally—is also a reflection of the notion that procedural rules are 
neutral (or are at least supposed to be) in force and effect.58  As Paul 
Carrington writes: “Neutrality with respect to the interests of particular 
groups of disputants is an obvious objective, indeed perhaps a 
effectiveness of the federal courts and thus indirectly of the legislative branch as well.  
The consequences of rulemaking are long-term, radiate in many directions, and relate to 
numerous other arrangements. 
 
Carrington, supra note 50, at 2072-73 (footnotes omitted). 
 55  David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil 
Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 394 (2010). 
 56  On the situating of rulemaking in the courts due to the perception of immunity from 
political influence, see Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, 
Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 889 (1999); Stephen B. 
Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 
1708 (2004); Laurens Walker, The End of the New Deal and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
82 IOWA L. REV. 1269, 1272-80 (1997). 
 57  Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, The Supreme Court’s Regulation of Civil 
Procedure: Lessons from Administrative Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1188, 1202-03 (2012) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 58  As David Marcus writes: 
If value is defined as a choice of substantive policy, a law is value-neutral if it does not 
directly regulate conduct “at the stage of primary private activity.”  By providing 
particularized procedural requirements for different areas of substantive law, substance-
specific rules directly contribute to the achievement of particular regulatory goals for 
individuals’ primary activity.  The preference or burden they foist upon a particular area 
of substantive policy thus precludes value-neutrality.  The generality of trans-substantive 
rules, however, does not permit such a direct connection between process and 
substantive end.  By this admittedly restrictive but (one hopes) analytically useful 
understanding of value, trans-substantive rules are indeed value-neutral. 
Marcus, supra note 55, at 380. 
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paramount value, of any enterprise engaged in dispute resolution.”59  
Over time, the rulemaking process has changed, permitting more of an 
interest group approach to rulemaking, through which more stakeholders 
are involved in the process, but the emphasis on trans-substantivity and 
neutrality still remains.60 
Of course, the theory of trans-substantivity barely leaves the dock 
before it starts to take on water.61  The Rules themselves are infused 
with examples where particular areas of law and claims are to be treated 
differently.62  There is discretion granted to district judges in numerous 
places, permitting ad hoc decisions throughout the course of a lawsuit.63  
Congress has intervened to impose specific procedural rules on claims 
by immigrants,64 prisoners,65 class action litigants,66 and securities 
litigants.67  Each district has its own rules and orders.  Indeed, every 
 59  Carrington, supra note 50, at 2074 (footnote omitted). 
 60  On the evolution of the rulemaking process, see Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 57, at 
1198-1201, and Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic 
Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficiency, 87 GEO. L. J. 887, 902-07 (1999).  I am quite mindful of the 
theoretical minefield that is traversed when one discusses neutrality in the law as a concept.  The 
critiques of neutrality as a possibility, or even its normative value, are legion, and they come from 
many quarters.  Representative scholarship on neutrality includes, Judith Resnik, On the Bias: 
Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877 (1988) 
(articulating a feminist perspective on neutral adjudication); DAVID KAIRYS, INTRODUCTION TO THE 
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 5-15 (David Kairys ed., 3rd ed. 1998) (offering a 
progressive critique of the neutrality of decision making); ROBERTO M. UNGER, THE CRITICAL 
LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 5-8 (1986) (offering the Critical Legal Studies critique of neutrality).  
When discussing procedural neutrality, perhaps a better way to think of neutrality in this context is 
“free from apparent bias.”  In common discourse, there is likely a consensus around the meaning of 
neutrality and impartiality that sidesteps more theoretical critiques of those concepts. 
 61  The justification for trans-substantivity is not always ironclad.  As Covert wrote: 
It is by no means intuitively apparent that the procedural needs of a complex antitrust 
action, a simple automobile negligence case, a hard-fought school integration suit, and an 
environmental class action to restrain the building of a pipeline are sufficiently identical 
to be usefully encompassed in a single set of rules which makes virtually no distinctions 
among such cases in terms of available process. 
Covert, supra note 52, at 732-33 (footnote omitted). 
 62  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 9, which requires pleading allegations of fraud with 
particularity. 
 63  Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of 
Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1929 (1989). 
 64  See, e.g., Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, § 348, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-639 (codified as amended 
at 8 U.S.C. 1182(h) (2006 & Supp. 2010)). 
 65  42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2006). 
 66  See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 §§ 4(a), 5, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453 (2006) 
(limiting access to state courts for certain types of class actions). 
 67  Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)  (imposing heightened pleading 
requirements in certain securities cases); Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 § 
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judge has his or her own court rules, and no two cases are ever treated 
exactly alike, let alone cases involving similar areas of law.68  Like 
Tolstoy’s description of unhappy families, which are each unhappy in 
unique ways, each case stands on its own, “in its own way.”69 
Despite the apparent challenges of trans-substantivity and neutrality 
in a system in which district- and judge-specific rules predominate, 
wide-ranging discretion is permitted, and legislated rules for particular 
areas of law have been created, the overarching principles remain: 
generally speaking, procedural rules should be simple and general; 
applicable to wide areas of law; and applied neutrally, regardless of the 
litigant or his or her case.70  When the norm of the neutrality of 
procedural rules is violated, and broken with respect to particular areas 
of law, this betrays the trans-substantive ethos of those rules, and the 
general purpose of the rules is undermined—to provide a neutral ground 
upon which substantive conflicts are resolved.71  Moreover, when this 
general purpose is undermined, it has broader implications for the proper 
functioning of the courts, for their legitimacy and for their role in the 
constitutional structure, as the following discussion shows. 
2. Due Process Concerns 
As the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, “[i]t is axiomatic that 
‘[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.’”72  
Thus, a fundamental aspect of due process is the right to have one’s case 
heard by an impartial adjudicator.73  If at the core of due process 
101, 15 U.S.C. § 77p (2006) (limiting state securities litigation). 
 68  David Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and the Practice of Rulemaking, 
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1973 (1989). 
 69  LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 1 (Richard Pevear & Larissa Volokhonsky, trans., 
2001). 
 70  As Richard Marcus writes: 
[A]t the heart of a neutralist perspective on procedure is an honest attempt to fashion 
rules that will fairly accommodate the concerns of accuracy, participation and efficiency.  
Although attitudes toward these concerns may be colored by matters of “ideology,” that 
is not somehow a trump that makes the entire exercise a charade. 
Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK. 
L. REV. 761, 774 (1993). 
 71  See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power, 52 J. OF LEG. ED. 342, 344 
(2002) (“[W]hen one knows that a rule has a statistically significant differential impact on a class of 
litigants or in a particular type of case, the veil is lifted, the myth of neutrality as to litigant power is 
exploded, and the question of lawmaking power to address the situation is unavoidable.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
 72  Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 876 (2009) (quoting In re 
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). 
 73  Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970).  On the evolution of due process rights in 
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protections lies the right to impartial adjudication, when judges apply 
otherwise neutral rules in a partial manner, it certainly violates those 
protections. 
Due process concerns are further implicated by the plausibility 
standard because of its very indeterminacy.  In other contexts, vague 
rules are seen as lending themselves to uneven application, and inviting 
biased decision making.  Legislative rules that are vague can be found to 
be void for vagueness under the due process rubric not only because they 
fail to give adequate notice to the public as to what behavior is expected, 
but also because they give too much discretion to those applying the 
rules to do so in a biased way.74  Standardless delegation of authority to 
administrative agencies by Congress can be deemed unconstitutional, 
although the Court has read this restriction narrowly since the New 
Deal.75  Discretionary employment practices that have a disparate impact 
on a protected class of employees can be the source of employer liability 
in the employment discrimination context.76  In the judicial context, 
vague standards raise similar concerns: i.e., they are susceptible to less 
than neutral application. 
While every grant of discretionary power is, perhaps, fraught with 
such danger, when the decision permits discretion with few guideposts 
beyond a particular judge’s subjective “experience and common sense,” 
and that discretion can result in the dismissal of a case with prejudice, it 
should raise deeper concerns about the risks posed by such near limitless 
discretion.  Although “abuse of discretion” is not the appropriate 
standard for appellate review of decisions on motions to dismiss, has the 
Supreme Court, with its focus on judicial experience and common sense, 
shifted the focus from a legal analysis toward judicial authority at the 
motion to dismiss stage that is more akin to discretion?  Moreover, does 
reliance on the district court judge’s judicial experience and common 
sense place appellate review out of reach?  Indeed, how can appellate 
judges ascertain whether a particular judge’s experience and common 
sense should suggest that a claim is plausible or not?  Thus, the broad 
leeway at the trial level leaves appellate judges, paradoxically, with little 
room to maneuver to serve as a check on district court judges’ 
the technological age, see Jason Parkin, Adaptable Due Process, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1309 (2012). 
 74  See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 359-61 (1983) (describing protections 
underlying the void-for-vagueness doctrine). 
 75  On the non-delegation doctrine and the Court’s narrow interpretation of it, see, e.g., John 
F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 223 
(2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000). 
 76  See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988). 
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authority.77 
3. Separation of Powers Concerns 
When courts apply otherwise neutral principles in ways that favor 
or disfavor certain litigants, they are making value judgments about the 
types of substantive rights they will enforce and those they will reject, 
without, it would seem, regard for the political judgments made by the 
legislative branch regarding the scope and reach of those rights.  This 
interplay between the substantive rights that courts must adjudicate and 
the procedural rights they must apply is captured in the Rules Enabling 
Act and its language limiting courts from abridging, enlarging or 
modifying substantive rights through the passage of procedural rules.78  
Despite the delegation of authority to the judiciary to draft its own rules 
of procedure, the limitation on that delegation with respect to protecting 
substantive rights—i.e., rights established by Congress—reflects the 
separation of powers logic behind the Rules Enabling Act and the 
delegation of authority it accomplished.79  In part, this division of 
authority reflects the perceived comparative institutional advantages of 
the different branches of government: the legislature determines the 
scope and existence of rights from within the crucible of the political 
arena, and the judiciary adjudicates those rights free from the passions of 
politics in accordance with neutral rules of the game.80  When judges do, 
 77  On the paradox of appellate review of district court judges, see LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM 
M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND 
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 237-241 (2013). 
 78  In the fifteen years immediately preceding the Twombly and Iqbal decisions, the Supreme 
Court affirmed the notion that the Rules can only be changed through the process set forth in the 
Rules Enabling Act or through an act of Congress.  See, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, NA, 534 U.S. 
506, 515 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 
U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 
 79  On the role of separation of powers concerns in the Rules Enabling Act, see, Stephen B. 
Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982).  Writing about an early 
draft of what would ultimately become the Rules Enabling Act, the Senate report on that legislation 
expressed concerns that delegating the ability to affect substantive rights would place a legislative 
function in the hands of the judiciary: 
Where a doubt exists as to the power of a court to make a rule, the doubt will surely be 
resolved by construing a statutory provision in such a way that it will not have the effect 
of an attempt to delegate to the courts what is in reality a legislative function. 
S. Rep. No. 69-1174, at 11.  For an analysis of FED. R. CIV. P. 4 in light of these separation of 
powers concerns, see generally Ralph U. Whitten, Separation of Powers Restrictions on Judicial 
Rulemaking: A Case Study of Federal Rule 4, 40 ME. L. REV. 41 (1988). 
 80  This arguably simplistic vision of lawmaking and the role of the judiciary are consistent 
with the legal process school’s view of both.  See generally HENRY HART & ALBERT SACKS, THE 
LEGAL PROCESS 158-74 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, eds., rev. ed. 1994).  On 
comparative institutional analysis and the separation of powers, see Neil K. Komesar, Taking 
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in fact, abridge, enlarge, or modify substantive rights through the 
drafting or application of procedural rules, it raises distinct separation of 
powers concerns.81 
4. Legitimacy 
At the core of the legitimacy of judicial decision making is the 
perception that courts are unbiased.  With no other power to enforce 
their own edicts, courts rely on the perceptions of their legitimacy; that 
legitimacy is undermined, in turn, by perceptions of partiality.82  
Furthermore, if the procedures through which a substantive decision is 
reached are perceived as fair, the public tends to accept the outcome 
regardless of whether a particular individual agrees with the substance of 
a particular result.  This position was most strongly advocated by 
members of the legal process school, who argued that as long as the 
procedure is right, the outcome is fair.83 
Of course, history reveals that judges are not immune from 
considering the political ramifications of their actions, and should be—
rightly—sensitive to the political climate in which their decisions are 
issued.84  In recent years, members of the Supreme Court have expressed 
Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for Constitutional Analysis, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 366 
(1984). 
 81  See Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts? Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 12 (2009) (statement of Stephen B. Burbank, David Berger 
Professor for the Administration of Justice, Univ. of Pa.) [hereinafter Burbank Testimony], available 
at http:// judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/12-02-09%20Burbank%20Testimony.pdf. 
 82  See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term—Forward: The Forms of 
Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 26 (1979) (impartiality is an important “predicate for judicial 
legitimacy”).  For representative scholarship on the legitimacy of judicial decision making, see 
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 44-48 (1980).  On perceptions of judicial activism, 
STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & FRANK B. CROSS, MEASURING JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 9-14 (2009). 
 83  Mark Spiegel, The Rule 11 Studies and Civil Rights Cases: An Inquiry into the Neutrality 
of Procedural Rules, 32 CONN. L. REV. 155, 166 (2000) (citations omitted).  These sentiments are 
echoed by others.  See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, 
Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1839-40 (2009) (“In international and 
constitutional law alike, the social psychology literature lends some support to the view, long 
intuited by judges and lawyers, that the perceived procedural fairness of judicial decision making 
plays an important role in establishing legitimacy and motivating compliance.  Constitutional rules 
or judicial decisions that appear to be “neutral” “principled,” or “impartial” may win public 
approval, regardless of the public’s agreement or disagreement with the outcomes on the merits.”) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 84  As Robert Post writes, courts must be attuned to the political ramifications of their 
actions, especially when they might undermine values important to the community: 
If courts genuinely believe that certain values are essential for the maintenance of the 
polity and of the rule of law, the fact that judicial decisions may undermine these values 
cannot blithely be dismissed as irrelevant to the internal purposes of the law.  Insofar as 
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these sentiments, in dissents85 and in public.86  Furthermore, in the 
majority opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania 
v. Casey,87 the justices expressed their collective recognition of the 
political context in which that case was being decided when they were 
invited to consider overruling Roe v. Wade.  There, the Court stated as 
follows: 
The root of American governmental power is revealed most clearly in 
the instance of the power conferred by the Constitution upon the 
Judiciary of the United States and specifically upon this Court.  As 
Americans of each succeeding generation are rightly told, the Court 
cannot buy support for its decisions by spending money and, except to 
a minor degree, it cannot independently coerce obedience to its 
decrees.  The Court’s power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of 
substance and perception that shows itself in the people’s acceptance 
of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation’s law means and to 
declare what it demands.88 
The clarity with which judges must assess the ramifications of their 
holdings points not to the complete separation between politics and 
legitimacy, but, rather, their connection and the narrow path judges must 
take when seeking to preserve that legitimacy.  That is, courts must be 
keenly sensitive to and aware of the political ramifications their decrees 
will have, while protecting against appearing “too political.”  The 
application of procedural rules is not immune from this walk on the 
political tightrope.  Indeed, as the experience with the 1983 amendments 
law is concerned with the fundamental commitments that underpin the solidarity of the 
polity—and these emphatically include the relative autonomy of the law itself—it would 
be self-defeating for judges to define their role in ways that ignore these fundamental 
commitments.  If judges incorrectly appraise these commitments—and in the past judges 
have been very badly mistaken in their estimations of the fundamental commitments of 
the polity—the political system will itself correct their error. 
Robert Post, Theorizing Disagreement: Reconceiving the Relationship Between Law and Politics, 
98 CALIF. L. REV. 1319, 1348 (2010) (footnotes omitted). 
 85  Justice Stevens’ dissent in Bush v. Gore, which was joined by Justices Ginsburg and 
Breyer, provides as follows: “[a]lthough we may never know with complete certainty the identity of 
the winner of this year’s Presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the 
Nation’s confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law.”  Bush v. Gore, 531 
U.S. 98, 128-29 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 86  As Justice Brennan, in public comments, stated: “Precisely because coercive force must 
attend any judicial decision to countermand the will of a contemporary majority, the Justices must 
render constitutional interpretations that are received as legitimate.”  William Brennan, The 
Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, Text and Teaching Symposium, 
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 3 (Oct. 12, 1985). 
 87  Planned Parenthood of Southwestern PA v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 88  Id. at 865. 
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to Rule 11 makes clear, when courts appear to be too political in their 
application of otherwise neutral procedural rules, the rulemaking 
apparatus can take corrective action and re-calibrate the rules to prevent 
against such actions when they become, themselves, threats to judicial 
legitimacy. 
To explore the role the rulemaking process can have in ensuring 
that procedural rules remain neutral and trans-substantive in their 
application to protect against implicating the due process, separate of 
powers, impartiality, and legitimacy concerns described above, we now 
turn to the experiences with the 1983 amendments to Rule 11 and the 
corrective action that followed in their wake. 
C. The Lessons of Rule 11 
In the civil rights context, in particular, remedial action has been 
taken when courts have appeared to overstep their judicial functions and 
were limiting substantive rights through procedural mechanisms.  The 
best example of this, perhaps, is when the rulemaking apparatus 
corrected perceived disparate enforcement of Rule 11.89  The 1983 
amendments to Rule 11,90 which were promulgated to deter frivolous 
 89  Another example can be found in Congress’ efforts to scale back some of the more 
onerous barriers the courts had put that made it more difficult for civil rights litigants to vindicate 
claims of employment discrimination.  After several Supreme Court precedents appeared to make it 
harder to plead and prove employment discrimination actions, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991, which restored some of the procedural standards erected by earlier judicial precedents.  
Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)).  For a 
detailed description of the legislative changes accomplished through the Act, see David A. Cathcart 
& Mark Snyderman, The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 8 LAB. LAWYER 849, 850-51 (1992). 
 90  The 1983 version of Rule 11 provided, in relevant part: 
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the 
pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and 
belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by 
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or 
to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.  If a pleading, 
motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after 
the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant.  If a pleading, motion, or 
other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own 
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an 
appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the 
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, 
or other paper, including a reasonable attorney’s fee. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (amended Apr. 28, 1983, effective Aug. 1, 1983).  See also Spiegel, supra note 
83, at 157 (“The 1983 amendments to Rule 11 added a requirement that the lawyer make a 
reasonable inquiry into the facts and the law before filing court papers, thereby adopting an 
objective standard in contrast to the pre-1983 version’s subjective standard.  Moreover, sanctions 
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claims and defenses,91 stimulated a debate regarding whether the 1983 
version of Rule 11 was procedurally neutral.92  First, the volume of 
decisions was particularly striking.  In the first forty-five years in which 
the Rule was in place, there had been twenty-five reported cases in 
which Rule 11 was invoked.  In just ten years after the 1983 amendment, 
there were more than 6,000 reported Rule 11 rulings.93  Moreover, 
several empirical studies provided data-driven insights about the impact 
of Rule 11 on civil rights cases.94  In March 1987, the Chief Judge of the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals appointed a Task Force to study the 
implementation of Rule 11.95  The Task Force collected data “regarding 
every motion for, and every sua sponte consideration of, sanctions under 
Rule 11 during the period July 1, 1987 through June 30, 1988” in the 
Third Circuit.96  Ultimately, while noting that their results were less 
stark than those in studies based on reported decisions alone, the Task 
Force concluded that “the findings tend to confirm published 
suggestions that the Rule has a disproportionate impact on civil rights 
plaintiffs.”97  The Third Circuit Report indicated that: 
Requests for sanctions in civil rights cases constituted only a slightly 
larger slice of our pie (24/132 or 18.2%) than one would expect on the 
basis of civil filings in this circuit (16% of civil filings in the period 
now became mandatory upon a finding of violation, and they could be imposed upon the lawyer, the 
client, or both.”). 
 91  FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note on 1983 amendments (“Greater attention by 
the district courts to pleading and motion abuses and the imposition of sanctions when appropriate, 
should discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help to streamline the litigation process by 
lessening frivolous claims or defenses.”). 
 92  See, e.g., Spiegel, supra note 83, at 160. 
 93  Id. at 157-58. 
 94  Although two earlier studies concluded that civil rights cases were disproportionately 
affected by the 1983 Rule 11 amendments, these studies were based solely on reported cases.  See 
Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Rule 11—Some “Chilling” Problems in the Struggle 
Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313 (1986); Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A 
Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189 (1988).  In contrast, four later empirical studies used more 
comprehensive methodologies that went beyond reported cases.  See Lawrence Marshall, Herbert 
M. Kritzer, & Frances Kahn Zemans, The Use and Impact of Rule 11, 86 NW. U.L. REV. 943 (1992) 
[hereinafter AJS Study]; Gerald F. Hess, Rule 11 Practice in Federal and State Court: An Empirical, 
Comparative Study, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 313 (1992) [hereinafter Hess Study]; FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
CENTER, RULE 11: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (1991) [hereinafter FJC REPORT]; STEPHEN R. BURBANK, 
AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 (1989) [hereinafter THIRD CIRCUIT 
REPORT]. 
 95  THIRD CIRCUIT REPORT, supra note 94, at ix. 
 96  Id. at 5. 
 97  Id. at xiv. 
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ending June30, 1988) . . . Yet, plaintiffs (and/or their counsel) were 
sanctioned on motion in civil rights (including employment 
discrimination) cases in our survey at a rate (8/17 or 47.1%) that is 
considerably higher than the rate (6/71 or 8.45%) for plaintiffs in non-
civil rights cases.98 
Similar to the Third Circuit Report, both the FJC Report and Hess Study 
employed methodologies that focused primarily on case data.99  
Although the FJC Report did not explicitly confirm that Rule 11 had a 
disproportionate impact on civil rights plaintiffs,100 its results were 
consistent with the findings of the Third Circuit Report where such an 
impact was found.101  As one commentator notes, “in the data reported 
by the FJC Study for the District of Arizona, although civil rights cases 
were 5% of total caseload, sanctions against civil rights cases were 14% 
of total sanctions imposed. This pattern was similar in other districts.”102  
Consistent with the results of the FJC Report, the Hess Study results 
indicated that Rule 11 had a disproportionate impact on civil rights 
cases: “A disproportionately high percentage of Rule 11 requests were 
made in civil rights cases (34%) compared to the portion of civil rights 
case on the docket (24%).”103 
 98  Id. at 69.  Based on the data produced in the THIRD CIRCUIT REPORT, Professor Spiegel 
used a distinct measure of disproportionality and derived that “although civil rights cases were 16% 
of total civil filings, they constituted 37% of the total number of cases where sanctions were 
imposed.”  Spiegel, supra note 83, at 172–73. 
 99  The FJC REPORT included the Rule 11 activity in five federal district courts—the District 
of Arizona, the District of the District of Columbia, the Northern District of Georgia, the Eastern 
District of Michigan, and the Western District of Texas—that were chosen due to the availability of 
computerized information.  FJC REPORT, supra note 94, Section 1B, at 1.  Ultimately, “[t]he FJC 
Study included more than 55,000 cases.”  Spiegel, supra note 83, at 170 (derived figure).  The Hess 
Study gathered data on state and federal cases in Spokane County, Washington.  Hess Study, supra 
note 94, at 316.  Federal court data was gathered for civil cases filed from August 1, 1983, to 
December 31, 1990, by searching docket sheets.  Hess Study, supra note 94, at 317.  State court data 
was gathered for civil cases “that initiated . . . Rule 11 activity between January 1, 1990, and 
December 31, 1990” by searching case files.  Hess Study, supra note 94, at 317. 
 100  FJC REPORT, supra note 94, Section 1C, at 1 (“To address the question of whether Rule 
11 sanctions have been imposed in cases involving good-faith arguments for change in the law, we 
recommend that the reader consult the individual case summaries and make an independent 
evaluation.”). 
 101  Spiegel, supra note 83, at 173-74 (footnotes omitted). 
 102  Id.  Professor Spiegel derived additional figures regarding sanction requests from the data 
in the FJC Report that also indicated disproportionality.  Id. at 171 (“Civil rights cases were 9.75% 
of the 55,328 cases, but comprised 22.76% of the Rule 11 cases.”). 
 103  Hess Study, supra note 94, at 352.  The Hess Study noted, however, that “civil rights 
plaintiffs were sanctioned at a similar rate (12% of requests) as other represented plaintiffs (16%).”  
Id. at 352.  When looking at sanctions imposed, rather than sanctions requested, it is evident that “a 
significantly higher percentage of sanctions were granted against civil rights plaintiffs as a 
percentage of total sanctions granted than the percentage of civil rights cases relative to the total 
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Unlike the three other empirical studies that focused on case data, 
the AJS Study made its determinations based on a survey of 4,494 
attorneys across three juridical circuits: the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth.104  
Notwithstanding this methodological difference, the AJS Study similarly 
concluded that Rule 11 had a disproportionate impact on civil rights 
cases.105  This conclusion was based on the fact that “[a]lthough civil 
rights cases made up 11.4% of federal cases filed, [the AJS Study] 
survey show[ed] that 22.7% of the cases in which sanctions had been 
imposed were civil rights cases.”106 
In response to these and other concerns, the rulemaking apparatus 
kicked in and Rule 11 was further amended in 1993 to make the 
imposition of sanctions discretionary, and, most importantly, to provide 
a “safe harbor”: litigants could avoid sanctions if their opponents point 
to some offending pleading or allegation and that pleading or allegation 
is withdrawn.107 
The responsiveness of the rulemaking system to legitimate concerns 
about disparate treatment under the otherwise neutral Rule 11 indicates 
the possibility that, should similar fears arise in light of the application 
of the plausibility standard under Rule 8, or any other procedural rule, 
the amendment process could be invoked to correct any such 
misapplication.  It is to the experience with the plausibility standard that 
we now turn. 
IV. GAUGING THE IMPACT OF TWOMBLY AND IQBAL 
A. The Impact of Twombly and Iqbal: Previous Studies 
Studies of the impact of Twombly and Iqbal on motion practice in 
federal courts have generated somewhat varying results.  One, conducted 
by Professor Patricia Hatamyar Moore, found a slight rise in dismissal 
caseload.”  Spiegel, supra note 83, at 173.  See also Hess Study, supra note 94, at 339. 
 104  AJS Study, supra note 94, at 950.  The survey elicited a response rate of 74.9%.  Id. 
 105  Id. at 966 (“our evidence tends to confirm the commentary about Rule 11’s 
disproportionate impact on civil rights cases.”). 
 106  Id. at 965–66.  It is also important to note that with respect to sanctions filed, as opposed 
to sanctions imposed, Rule 11 motions were filed in 18.7% of civil rights cases whereas civil rights 
cases made up only 11.4% of federal cases filed.  Id. at 965.  See also Spiegel, supra note 83, at 
172. 
 107  See David Marcus, supra note 55, at 420 (“Once its ramifications in terms of its impact 
on civil rights litigation manifested themselves, the Advisory Committee revised [Rule 11] and 
thereby weakened the blow.”).  For an overview of the 1993 amendments to Rule 11, see Byron C. 
Keeling, Toward a Balanced Approach to “Frivolous” Litigation: A Critical Review of Federal 
Rule 11 and State Sanctions Provisions, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 1067, 1090-94 (1994). 
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rates in motions after Twombly but before Iqbal, from 46 percent to 48 
percent.  After Iqbal, she found a larger increase, with a dismissal rate of 
56 percent.108  A more recent study conducted for the federal Judicial 
Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, found differing 
results.109 Unlike the Hatamyar study, this study conducted sampling of 
decisions from a number of districts and did not rely on decisions 
reported in electronic databases.  While this study found an increase in 
the dismissal rate in the sampled cases from 66 percent to 75 percent, it 
did not find a rise in dismissal rates in most categories of cases where 
leave to re-plead was not granted.110 
One shortcoming of these previous studies is that both looked at 
outcomes in motions to dismiss based on a range of grounds, not just for 
lack of specificity of the pleadings.  A more recent study,111 conducted 
by one of the co-authors of this Article, attempted to overcome this 
apparent shortcoming by conducting a study of outcomes in cases 
involving motions to dismiss where only the specificity of the pleadings 
was challenged.  That study focused only on the outcomes in cases in 
 108  Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter 
Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 601-02 (2010).  Professor Moore has since published a 
follow-up piece that found results similar to those found in her initial study.  See Patricia Hatamyar 
Moore, An Updated Quantitative Study of Iqbal’s Impact on 12(b)(6) Motions, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 
603 (2012).  Other studies have also engaged in similar empirical analysis of different parts of the 
Twombly/Iqbal puzzle.  See, e.g., Scott Dodson, A New Look: Dismissal Rates of Federal Civil 
Claims, 96 JUDICATURE 127 (2012) (showing increased dismissal rates in post-Iqbal sample of 
cases when compared to pre-Twombly sample).  Victor D. Quintanilla, Beyond Common Sense: A 
Social Psychological Study of Iqbal’s Effect on Claims of Race Discrimination, 17 MICH. J. RACE & 
L. 1 (2011) (analyzing dismissal rates in employment discrimination cases brought by black 
litigants, and comparing dismissal rates based on the race of the judge in such cases).  For a full 
collection of published and unpublished studies to date of Iqbal’s effect, see David Freeman 
Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203 
(June 2013). 
 109  See JOE S. CECIL ET AL., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER 
IQBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 1, 13 (Fed. 
Judicial Ctr., 2011) [hereinafter CECIL REPORT], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1878646.  An 
updated analysis for the Federal Judicial Center confirmed the previous report’s findings.  See JOE. 
S. CECIL, ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., UPDATE ON RESOLUTION OF RULE 12(B)(6) MOTIONS 
GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
ON CIVIL RULES (2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal2.pdf/ 
$file/motioniqbal2.pdf. 
 110  Id. at 13.  While the dismissal rate of dismissals with prejudice remained static for most 
types of cases, the Cecil Report found one area in which dismissal rates rose significantly after 
Iqbal, i.e., in those cases involving “financial instruments,” including mortgages.  Id. at 12.  In the 
pre-Twombly cases, the general dismissal rate was 47 percent (without leave to re-plead) in such 
cases; after Iqbal, a general dismissal rate 92 percent (without leave to re-plead).  Id. at 14, tbl. 4. 
 111 Brescia, supra note 11, at 239. 
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which the plaintiffs alleged employment or housing discrimination.112  
Finally, that study looked beyond just dismissal rates to look at other 
aspects of these decisions—e.g., the number of motions filed and 
dismissals granted on these grounds, and the nature of the application of 
the plausibility test by the district court judges when assessing the 
sufficiency of the pleadings.  That study showed: 
Dismissal Rates.  In the pre-Twombly group of cases, the overall 
dismissal rate was 61 percent, and 46 percent of cases were dismissed, at 
least partially “with prejudice.” In the period between Twombly and 
Iqbal, the overall dismissal rate was 56 percent, with the “with 
prejudice” rate 40 percent.  After Iqbal, the overall dismissal rate rose to 
72 percent, with the “with prejudice” rate rising to 50 percent.113 
Application of the Plausibility Standard.  That previous study 
also provided an analysis of the manner in which courts were applying 
the plausibility test.  It revealed that district courts almost never invoked 
the “More Plausible Test,” nor did they even assess the plausibility of 
the allegations in the complaint.  Rather, to the extent courts ostensibly 
reviewed the plausibility of the pleadings, what they did, if they invoked 
plausibility at all, was simply assessed whether the plaintiffs had pled 
the elements of their claims.114  Similarly, judges did not invoke their 
“jud[icial] experience and common sense” in assessing the adequacy of 
the pleadings.115 
Volume of Motions and Dismissals.  In the time periods analyzed 
in the previous study, both the number of motions filed, and the number 
of dismissals granted, rose considerably after Iqbal.  For example, 
decisions on such motions after Iqbal were generated at a rate greater 
than five times the rate pre-Twombly, suggesting that motions to dismiss 
on the grounds the complaint lacked specificity were filed at a much 
higher rate after Iqbal.116  Additionally, the number of cases in which 
complaints were dismissed, either in whole or in part, rose dramatically 
after Iqbal: for example, 26 cases were dismissed pre-Twombly, while 
 112  Id.  Like several other studies, this study also suffers from its limitations.  One of which 
is that it does not use covariate controls, and does not attempt to engage in a qualitative comparison 
of the complaints in decisions issued pre- and post-Twombly.  See Engstrom, supra note 108, at 
1213-15.  Such a granular and qualitative analysis would likely be beneficial, and would certainly 
enrich the dialogue concerning the true impact of Iqbal on both judicial and litigant behavior in its 
wake.  Whether such an analysis would yield a sufficient volume of quantitative data is another 
question entirely, given the labor-intensive nature of such work and the difficulty of identifying 
qualitatively similar pleadings filed before and after Iqbal. 
 113  Brescia, supra note 11, at 260-61. 
 114  Id. at 277-79. 
 115  Id. at 284. 
 116  Id. at 280-83. 
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115 were dismissed in a similar time-frame post-Iqbal.117 
B. Methodology 
The instant study draws from the database compiled for the original 
Iqbal Effect study.118  A quick overview of that database follows.119  
First, a collection of 548 cases120 was gathered using various search 
terms in the Lexis database of reported decisions.121  The goal was to 
identify decisions on motions to dismiss in employment and housing 
discrimination cases122 in which the specificity of the pleadings was 
challenged.123  Three groups of cases were then created: Group I 
included decisions on such motions issued between January 2004 and 
the decision in Twombly; Group II included decision on such motions 
issued between Twombly and before the decision in Iqbal; Group III 
included decisions issued after Iqbal, and before mid-December 2010.  
 117  Id. 
 118  See id. 
 119  For a detailed overview of the methodology utilized in compiling the database, see id. at 
262-68. 
 120  The original Iqbal Effect database held well more than 600 cases.  In this study, decisions 
issued by magistrate judges, who are not nominated by the Executive, were excluded.  For an 
overview of the rule of magistrate judges in the federal system, see generally Tim A. Baker, The 
Expanding Role of Magistrate Judges in the Federal Courts, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 661 (2005). 
 121  Admittedly, a limit to this study is the fact that it relied on only decisions published in an 
electronic database.  To the extent that such electronically published sources result in a higher 
percentage of decisions in which the motions were granted, on the belief judges are more likely to 
submit such decisions for publication, such a distortion is as likely to have impacted the pre-
Twombly data set as in the post-Twombly and post-Iqbal data sets.  To the extent that it did (and to 
the extent such a distortion exists at all), it is likely to have affected all three data sets similarly.  For 
an analysis of the differences between published and unpublished decisions in the context of 
employment discrimination litigation, see Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, Studying the 
Iceberg from Its Tip: A Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination 
Cases, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1133 (1990). 
 122  The study included cases asserting claims under the following laws: the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 § 703(a)(1)-(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (2006)(Title VII); Rehabilitation Act of 
1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (2006); the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 102(a), 42 
U.S.C.A. § 12112(a) (2006); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.A. § 
621 (2006); Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C.A. § 206(d) (2006); Family and Medical Leave Act of 
1993, 29 U.S.C.A. § 2601 (2006); Equal Protection claims implicating employment or housing 
discrimination, which are described in see DAVID W. LEE, HANDBOOK OF SECTION 1983 
LITIGATION § 2.15[A][1] 323-28 (2011); and housing discrimination claims under the Civil Rights 
Act (FHA) of 1968 § 801-819, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601-3619 (2006).  Cases asserting retaliation under 
any of these protections were also included in the study.  See Anna Ku, Note, “You’re Fired!”  
Determining Whether a Wrongly Terminated Employee Who Has Been Reinstated with Back Pay 
Has an Actionable Title VII Retaliation Claim, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1663, 1667-68 (2007) 
(describing elements of retaliation claims). 
 123  A detailed description of these searches can be found in Brescia, supra note 11, at 262-
264, nn. 118-123. 
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A range of techniques were utilized to exclude motions to dismiss that 
did not involve challenges to the specificity of the pleadings, including, 
inter alia, such grounds as expiration of relevant statutes of limitations 
or failure to exhaust administrative remedies.124 
Cases were then coded based on the outcome of the decision on the 
motion to dismiss in each case.  Consistent with the manner in which 
other studies have coded decision outcomes, if any aspect of a motion to 
dismiss was granted, it was treated as a dismissal.125  In the original 
Iqbal Effect study, outcomes were further refined to whether each matter 
was dismissed “with prejudice” or without.  In that study, cases were 
categorized as dismissed “with prejudice” in one of three scenarios: 
when the deciding court explicitly denied leave to re-plead; when it 
found that the matter was dismissed with prejudice; or, simply, if the 
opinion was silent on whether the plaintiff could re-plead any claims.126  
This study did not go into such detail. 
Once the database was compiled and the cases coded, the dismissal 
rate in the decisions was analyzed based on certain characteristics of the 
deciding district court judge: i.e., the judge’s race or ethnicity, the 
gender of the judge, and the party affiliation of the president who 
nominated the judge.127  The results of this analysis follow. 
C. Results 
1. Overall Dismissal Rates 
Taken as a whole, the dismissal rates for all cases in the database 
across the three time periods are as follows.  In Group I, the pre-
Twombly period, the dismissal rate for all employment and housing 
discrimination cases in which the specificity of the pleadings was 
challenged was 62 percent.  In the period immediately following the 
issuance of the Twombly opinion, but before Iqbal (i.e., Group II), the 
dismissal rate actually went down, to 56 percent.  Following Iqbal (i.e., 
the Group III cases), the dismissal rate for all cases increased to 71 
 124  For a detailed overview of the bases for excluding cases from the database, see id. at 264-
68. 
 125  See, e.g., CECIL REPORT, supra note 109, at 5. 
 126  See Brescia, supra note 11, at 261.  According to the federal rules, a dismissal is 
considered an “adjudication on the merits” unless the deciding court explicitly states that the 
outcome is without prejudice. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).  This methodology was also used in the CECIL 
REPORT, supra note 109, at 5. 
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percent.  These results are displayed graphically below in Table 1. 
 
TABLE 1: OVERALL DISMISSAL RATES.128 
 
 
2. Dismissal Rates by Party Affiliation of the Nominating President 
As discussed above, the cases were identified by the party 
affiliation of the president who nominated the judge issuing the decision 
in each case.  The dismissal rates of those decisions revealed a 
statistically significant129 difference in the outcome in these cases.  
Moreover, identifying the cases in this way reveals somewhat diverging 
results from the overall dismissal results laid out in Table 1, above. 
Of the motions decided by judges nominated by Democratic 
presidents in Group I, 64 percent were dismissed.  The Group II and 
Group III figures are 58 percent and 67 percent, respectively.  The 
difference in these case outcomes across the three time periods was not 
statistically significant. 
The results of cases issued by judges nominated by Republican 
presidents, on the other hand, reveals statistically significant differences 
across the three time periods.  In the Group I period, these judges 
dismissed 61 percent of the cases before them.  In the Group II period, 
the dismissal rate went down to 54 percent of cases.  In the Group III 
period, the dismissal rate rose considerably, to 74 percent.  In other 
 128  The raw values for each Table can be found at infra Appendix A. 
 129  The p-values for each Table can be found at infra Appendix B. 
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words, there was a 37 percent increase in dismissal rates after Iqbal 
when compared to the time-period after Twombly, but before Iqbal.  
Comparing the pre-Twombly period to the post-Iqbal period, there was a 
21 percent increase in dismissal rates in cases decided by judges 
nominated by Republican presidents. 
These outcomes reveal a statistically significant difference in the 
dismissal rates across these time periods for judges nominated by 
Republican presidents, meaning the outcomes in Twombly and Iqbal 
would appear to have had a statistically significant impact on the 
decisions on motions challenging the specificity of the pleadings on 
judges nominated by Republican presidents. 
The outcomes in cases based on the political party of the 
nominating presidents are displayed graphically in Table 2, below. 
TABLE 2: DISMISSAL RATES BY PARTY AFFILIATION OF THE 
NOMINATING PRESIDENT. 
 
3. Dismissal Rates by Gender of Deciding Judge 
To assess the relevance of other characteristics of the deciding 
judges, two more tests were performed on the data, one based on the 
gender of the deciding judge and a second based on the race of the 
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deciding judge.  For gender, male judges in the Group I time period 
dismissed cases 61 percent of the time; for Group II, 52 percent of the 
time; and in Group III, 70 percent of the time.  Female judges dismissed 
cases in the Group I time period 64 percent of the time; in the Group II 
time period, 66 percent of the time; and in the Group III time period, 72 
percent of the time.  The differences in outcomes of decisions issued by 
male judges, set forth graphically in Table 3, were statistically 
significant. 
 
 TABLE 3: DISMISSAL RATES BY GENDER OF JUDGE. 
 
4. Dismissal Rates by Race of Judge 
A final dismissal rate analysis consisted of determining the 
dismissal rates for judges based on their race.  For white judges, they 
dismissed cases in Group I 60 percent of the time; in Group II, 59 
percent of the time; and in Group III, 72 percent of the time.  These 
differences were statistically significant.  For African-American judges, 
the dismissal rate in Group I was 64 percent; in Group II, 44 percent; in 
Group III, 62 percent.  For Hispanic or Latino judges, the dismissal rate 
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was 75 percent in the Group I time period; 38 percent in the Group II 
time period; and 90 percent in the Group III time period.  For Asian-
American judges, the Group I dismissal rate was 100 percent and the 
Group III dismissal rate was 50 percent.  For Hispanic or Latino and 
Asian-American judges, the sample sizes were so small that these results 
are not particularly informative.130  These results are displayed in Table 
4, below. 
TABLE 4: DISMISSAL RATES BY THE RACE OF THE DECIDING JUDGE. 
5. Number of Motions and Number of Dismissals
Previous research revealed a significant increase in the number of 
reported decisions on motions challenging the specificity of the 
pleadings and the number of dismissals based on these grounds.  Indeed, 
a comparison of similar time frames pre-Twombly, post-Twombly and 
post-Iqbal, revealed just twelve reported decisions per calendar quarter 
on motions challenging the specificity of the pleadings before Twombly, 
but sixty-one such decisions in a post-Iqbal quarter.  Furthermore, the 
number of decisions dismissing cases, in whole or in part, pre-Twombly 
was just forty-six but in a similar time period post-Iqbal, was 196.131 
This data was analyzed to determine the extent to which some of 
 130  Where the expected frequencies are small, the Pearson Chi-Square Test diminishes in 
utility.  Instead, one might use Fisher’s Exact Test. 
131  See Brescia, supra note 11, at 280-83. 
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these results—both the number of reported decisions and the number of 
dismissals—included any statistically significant difference in the 
number of reported cases and dismissed cases by the party affiliation of 
the president who nominated each judge.  Here, we also compared the 
number of decisions and dismissals by party affiliation of the nominating 
president to the overall number of district court judges by that same 
affiliation to determine if there was disproportionate representation of 
either class of judges in this pool of decisions and dismissals.  If there 
was a disproportionate number of dismissals by a particular class of 
judge, one could posit that litigant behavior was steering defendants to 
make more motions before a certain class of judge.132  However, we saw 
very little variation between the number of decisions and dismissals 
based on the party affiliation of the nominating president.  If anything, 
there was a slight overrepresentation of decisions and dismissals issued 
by judges nominated by Democratic presidents, which suggests that 
defendants may not be choosing to make motions only before those 
judges that might be perceived as more likely to grant such dismissals.  
The results of this analysis are displayed below in Tables 5133 and 6.  
The “expected” outcomes are a reflection of the anticipated results if the 
makeup of the judges in the data base pool was a reflection of the 
makeup of the overall number of district court judges by party affiliation 










 132  On litigant behavior in the shadow of Twombly and Iqbal, see Jonah B. Gelbach, 
Selection in Motion: A Formal Model of Rule 12(B)(6) and the Twombly-Iqbal Shift in Pleading 
Policy (Yale L. Sch., Aug. 29, 2012) available at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=2138428. 
 133  See infra, Appendix C for a time line of Table 5 showing the number of cases in the 
database compared to the expected outcomes.  The similarities between the actual outcome and the 
expected outcome are striking, which suggests that the method utilized in case selection was 
effective at identifying a representative sample of cases. 
 134  For a breakdown of the judiciary based on the party affiliation of the nominating 
president, see ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, THE STATE OF THE JUDICIARY: PRESIDENT OBAMA AND THE 
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TABLE 5: NUMBER OF REPORTED DECISIONS IN DATA BASE BY 
PARTY AFFILIATION OF NOMINATING PRESIDENT COMPARED TO 
EXPECTED OUTCOMES BY CLASSIFICATION OF ALL DISTRICT COURT 
JUDGES. 
 
TABLE 6: NUMBER OF DISMISSALS BY PARTY AFFILIATION OF 
NOMINATING PRESIDENT COMPARED TO EXPECTED OUTCOMES BY 
CLASSIFICATION OF ALL DISTRICT COURT JUDGES. 
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D. Implications 
The analysis of granted dismissal motions in employment and 
housing discrimination cases based on the lack of specificity of the 
pleadings reveals a statistically significant difference in outcomes based 
on the political party of the president who nominated the judges granting 
the motions.  In the cases analyzed in this study, the dismissal rates on 
motions before judges nominated by Republican presidents are higher 
than for judges nominated by Democratic presidents.  There were no 
statistically significant results with respect to judges nominated by 
Democratic presidents while there were for judges nominated by 
Republican presidents.  While the differences are not stark, they raise 
questions that warrant further analysis and study. 
Looking simply at the universe of civil rights cases assessed in this 
study, the discrepancy in outcomes between the two classes of judges—
described by the party affiliation of the president who nominated the 
judge—call for more in-depth analysis of outcomes in all civil rights 
cases, and in all cases in general.  One shortcoming of this study is that it 
did not compare outcomes in civil rights cases to outcomes in other 
types of cases.  While other studies have done that, as stated earlier, 
those studies had their limitations.  While the Hatamyar study showed a 
rise in dismissal rates in civil rights cases, the Cecil Report did not.  
Those studies, however, did not assess outcomes in motions just 
challenging the specificity of the pleadings: i.e., the heart of the issue in 
both Twombly and Iqbal.  Thus, more research is needed to determine if 
in civil rights cases, judges—regardless of the president nominating 
them—are more prone to dismiss these cases as opposed to others. 
Analysis of more recent cases, and of all decisions, not just those 
reported in electronic databases, is warranted.  If these findings bear 
out—that the plausibility standard is being wielded disproportionately 
against civil rights plaintiffs by judges nominated by Republican 
presidents—it raises questions about the viability of the plausibility 
standard as a neutral rule of procedure that is applied impartially and 
evenly across all substantive areas of law. 
What might be some cause for relief is that the outcomes were not 
starker.  In addition, as previous research indicates, judges do not seem 
to be applying their “judicial experience and common sense” to gauge 
which story was more plausible: the one that alleged illicit conduct or 
the one that suggested no such conduct had occurred.  In other words, 
judges seem to be ignoring the way in which the Court deployed the 
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plausibility standard in both Twombly and Iqbal.135  While that may 
point to the fact that the most problematic aspect of the standard—its 
indeterminacy—may not appear to be infecting judicial decision making, 
it raises even more questions about how judges, are, in fact, behaving in 
the wake of the introduction of the new pleading standard.  If judges 
were applying the More Plausible Test in the same way in which the 
Court did in Twombly and Iqbal, we would have some way to determine 
how judges were using the plausibility standard, and appellate courts 
would have more ground on which to stand when conducting their 
reviews of lower court decisions.  The fact that all judges—regardless of 
the party affiliation of the president who nominated them—appear to be 
dismissing more civil rights cases under Twombly and Iqbal then they 
did before their issuance, and that judges nominated by Republican 
presidents seem to be dismissing such cases at a higher rate, while, at the 
same time, courts are not deploying the plausibility standard in the same 
way the Court did in Twombly and Iqbal, suggests that trial courts see 
these precedents as license to dismiss civil rights cases more frequently 
regardless of the new plausibility standard. 
Admittedly, this research merely scratches the surface of these 
issues and more research could, and should, be undertaken.  In light of 
the decade-long experience with the 1983 amendments to Rule 11, the 
rulemaking apparatus took a hard look at judicial practice in light of the 
Rule’s new provisions and found it disconcerting enough to revise the 
Rule to reduce the impact of its new provisions on litigants in general, 
and, arguably, civil rights plaintiffs in particular.  This research, if it 
does anything, suggests that the plausibility standard warrants a similar 
hard look at practice since its introduction. 
IV. CONCLUSION: THE PROMISE OF PROCEDURE 
Many have seen parallels between the quintessential American 
institution of baseball and the law and the legal system through which it 
is mediated.136  Legal scholarship often draws from these parallels, 
 135  For a discussion of this phenomenon, what Burbank and Subrin call “lawlessness cubed,” 
i.e., that the Supreme Court, in Twombly and Iqbal, ignored the requirements of the Rules Enabling 
Act for amending the rules, and, in turn, lower courts seem to be ignoring the heart of these 
precedents, see Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a 
Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C. R. C. L. L. REV. 399, 407-408 (2011). 
 136  As Paul Finkelman writes: 
[B]aseball is itself a highly legalistic game. It has an elaborate set of rules, far more so 
than most other games. At the professional level it requires a highly trained multi-judge 
panel of umpires to implement and interpret the rules. Every pitch requires a legal 
ruling. Every time a ball is hit, one of the umpires must make a ruling on whether it is 
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mining the elegance of the infield fly rule as law,137 drawing connections 
between the Electoral College and the World Series,138 or identifying the 
similarities between the Erie doctrine and the functioning of the 
designated hitter rule in interleague play.139  With Twombly and Iqbal, 
Arthur Miller has even evoked the old Chicago Cubs double play 
combination of Tinkers, Evers, and Chance immortalized in poem in 
calling Conley to Twombly to Iqbal a “double play” on the rules of civil 
procedure.140 
Judges are not immune from the metaphor of baseball as law.  
During Chief Justice Roberts’s confirmation hearing, he famously 
promised to serve as a faithful umpire, calling balls and strikes and not 
making law or interjecting himself into the legal contests before him.141 
This metaphor of the objective umpire is apt when assessing the 
role procedural rules should play in the contests they play a critical role 
in resolving.  While there are those that look at the application of 
procedural laws as political, and the promise of neutral adjective law a 
sham, some recognize the important normative role the promise of 
procedural neutrality can play, what Robert Cover called its 
“aspiration.”142 
Indeed, it is this promise of procedural neutrality that provides a 
normative metric to assess whether judges interject themselves into 
conflicts improperly by applying otherwise neutral rules in a non-
fair or foul. As with our legal system, each umpire has a jurisdiction. The home plate 
umpire calls a hit ball fair or foul before it reaches a base; the first or third base umpires 
make the call after the ball is beyond their bag. In the World Series extra umpires are on 
the field, creating a mini-Supreme Court which provides new pairs of eyes to scrutinize 
plays in the outfield. 
Paul Finkelman, Baseball and the Rule of Law, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 239, 241-42 (1998) (citations 
omitted).  A collection of representative scholarship drawing these parallels can be found in 
BASEBALL AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL MIND (Spencer Waller et al. eds., 1995). 
 137  Aside, The Common Law Origins of the Infield Fly Rule, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1474, 1476-
77 (1975). 
 138  Michael Herz, How the Electoral College Imitates the World Series, 23 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1191 (2002). 
 139  Ian Group, Level Playing Fields and Parallel Tracks: A Look at the Development of the 
Erie Doctrine and the Designated Hitter Rule, 22 NYSBA ENTERTAINMENT, ARTS, AND SPORTS 
LAW JOURNAL 89 (2011). 
 140  See Miller, supra note 44.  See also, William Hageman, Remembering “Tinkers to Evers 
to Chance,” CHICAGO TRIBUNE, July 10, 2010, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-07-
05/news/ct-tinker-cubs-story_1_gonfalon-bubble-cubs-fan-poem. 
 141  Chief Justice Roberts asserted as follows: “I will remember that it’s my job to call balls 
and strikes, and not to pitch or bat.”  Todd S. Purdum & Robin Toner, Senators to Question 1st 
Supreme Court Nominee in 11 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/ 
09/13/politics/politicsspecial1/13confirm.html?scp=183&sq=roberts+supreme+court&st=nyt&_r=0. 
 142  Covert, supra note 52, at 733. 
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objective way.  When that occurs, corrective action is possible, as when 
the 1983 amendments to Rule 11 were further amended just 10 years 
later to allay fears that this rule was being used disproportionately 
against certain types of litigants. 
It is likely no accident that new theories and rights were established 
to protect those with less power just as the promise of procedural 
neutrality and trans-substantivity took its firmest hold.  If a party could 
only assert substantive claims within well-worn procedural tracks, it 
would necessarily disfavor the prosecution of new and novel claims that 
failed to fit into such tracks.  In such a regime, it is difficult to image 
creative claims—such as those striking down restrictive covenants and 
school segregation in the years following the introduction of the federal 
rules or laws banning same-sex marriage today—ever seeing the light of 
day.143 
Returning to the baseball metaphor, a cynic’s view of this 
American sport in the early Twenty-First Century would suggest that it 
is all a racket, designed to make athletes and their boosters fabulously 
wealthy at the expense of values far more essential to the advancement 
of society. 
Just as the myth and mythology around sports have their own logic 
and value, the promise of procedural neutrality, like the hermeneutical 
approach in The Life of Pi, is the far “better story.”144  Those that deny 
its force run the risk of rendering any arguments against improper 
judicial bias toothless.  Without this normative value, the promise of 
procedural neutrality will surrender to the forces of will and power.  
Moreover, when those with the least power attempt to fight on fields 
where power alone is the basis on which contests are decided, the 
powerless will always lose.145 
Fealty to and belief in the norm of procedural neutrality is essential 
to protect those without formal power within the system and to remain 
true to the promise of equal justice under law.  While this may be a game 
 143  As Richard Marcus writes: 
In the end, it is important to remember that the dangers posed are real should the views 
of the critics prevail.  Before we turn our backs on the neutral and trans-substantive 
system we have today, we should reflect long and hard on the benefits that system has 
provided.  Whatever the short-term advantages of deals that may be arranged politically 
for favored types of litigants or litigation, the long-term risks of throwing out the baby 
with the bathwater seem to me very serious. 
Marcus, supra note 70, at 825. 
 144  YANN MARTELL, THE LIFE OF PI 398 (2002). 
 145  See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 50, at 2075 (“Procedural neutrality over the longer term 
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played by the naïve, is there any other choice?  To paraphrase Winston 
Churchill when speaking about democracy, the promise of procedural 
neutrality may be seen by some as a less favored approach; it may be 
only when compared to all others that have been tried.146 
Let us close with the words of Bart Giamatti, who preferred what 
many would call a romantic view of baseball. 
 
Of course, there are those who learn after the first few times.  They 
grow out of sports.  There are also others who were born with the 
wisdom to know that nothing lasts.  These are the truly tough among 
us, the ones who can live without illusion, or without even the hope of 
illusion.  I am not that grown-up or up-to-date.  I am a simpler 
creature, tied to more primitive patterns and cycles.  I need to think 
something lasts forever, and it might as well be that state of being that 




















 146  Statement of Winston Churchill, 444 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.) (1947) 206-07 (U.K.) (“It 
has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all the others that have been 
tried.”). 
 147  A. Bartlett Giamatti, The Green Fields of the Mind, reprinted in A GREAT AND 
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APPENDIX A: 
 
Dismissal Rates  
 Group I Group II Group III Total 
Not Dismissed 64 66 67 197 
Dismissed 104 85 162 351 
Total 168 151 229 548 
Dismissal Rate 61.90% 56.29% 70.74% - 
 
 
Dismissal Rates by Gender  
 Group I Group II Group III Total 
Male     
 Not 
Dismissed 
49 51 48 148 
 Dismissed 77 56 112 245 
 Total 126 107 160 393 
 Dismissal 
Rate 
61.11% 52.34% 70.00% - 
Female     
 Not 
Dismissed 
15 15 19 49 
 Dismissed 27 29 50 106 
 Total 42 44 69 155 
 Dismissal 
Rate 
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Dismissal Rates by Party Affiliation of Nominating President 
 
 Group I Group II Group III Total 
Democrat     
 Not 
Dismissed 
27 30 33 90 
 Dismissed 47 42 67 156 
 Total 74 72 100 246 
 Dismissal 
Rate 
63.51% 58.33% 67.00% - 
Republican     
 Not 
Dismissed 
37 36 34 107 
 Dismissed 57 43 95 195 
 Total 94 79 129 302 
 Dismissal 
Rate 



























Akron Law Review, Vol. 47 [2014], Iss. 2, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol47/iss2/2
02 BRESCIA MACRO 3 (DO NOT DELETE) 7/1/2014  2:44 PM 
2014 THE POLITICS OF PROCEDURE 369 
Dismissal Rates by Race or Ethnicity 
 Group I Group II Group III Total 
White     
 Not 
Dismissed 
53 51 52 156 
 Dismissed 80 74 132 286 
 Total 133 125 184 442 
 Dismissal 
Rate 
60.15% 59.20% 71.74% - 
African American     
 Not 
Dismissed 
8 10 11 29 
 Dismissed 14 8 18 40 
 Total 22 18 29 69 
 Dismissal 
Rate 
63.64% 44.44% 62.07% - 
Hispanic     
 Not 
Dismissed 
3 5 1 9 
 Dismissed 9 3 9 21 
 Total 12 8 10 30 
 Dismissal 
Rate 
75.00% 37.50% 90.00% - 
Asian American     
 Not 
Dismissed 
0 0 3 3 
 Dismissed 1 0 3 4 
 Total 1 0 6 7 
 Dismissal 
Rate 
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APPENDIX B:   
STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE 
To determine whether there was a statistically significant 
relationship between dismissal and time group for each demographic 
characteristic, we used the Pearson Chi-Square Test of independence.  In 
contrast to the original Iqbal Effect study, cases in which any aspect of a 
motion to dismiss was granted were coded “Dismissed” and all other 
cases were coded “Not dismissed.”  Consistent with the prior study, 
however, the cases were coded Group I, II, or III where “Group I” 
includes decisions on motions issued between January 2004 and the 
decision in Twombly, “Group II” includes decisions on such motions 
issued between Twombly and before the decision in Iqbal, and “Group 
III” includes decisions issued after Iqbal and before mid-December 
2010.  For each demographic characteristic, we populated a contingency 
table using the levels of the dismissal and time group variables.  For 
example, see Table B1 below.  In Table B1, the figure in the 
“Dismissed”, “Group II” cell of the Republican contingency table (43) 
represents the frequency of cases where a judge nominated by a 
Republican affiliated President granted any aspect of a motion to dismiss 
after the decision in Twombly and before the decision in Iqbal.  The 
contingency tables were then used to calculate the p-values in Table B2 
below.  P-values of .05 are typically considered statistically significant. 
 








Not dismissed 37 36 34 107 
Dismissed 57 43 95 195 
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TABLE B2: P-VALUES 
Table Variables Compared P-value 
1 Total: Dismissal & Group 0.013 
2 Republican: Dismissal & Group 0.012 
2 Democrat: Dismissal & Group 0.508 
3 Male: Dismissal & Group 0.013 
3 Female: Dismissal & Group 0.612 
4 White: Dismissal & Group 0.032 
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APPENDIX C: 
This appendix sets forth the number of cases per quarter decided by 
judges nominated by Democratic presidents and Republican presidents.  
The solid line indicates the number generated from the database.  The 
dotted line presents the number that would be expected if the same 
proportion of judges nominated by party affiliation of the nominating 
president existed in the database as does for the entire body of federal 
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